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D
PRAbstractThe minimum cost spanning tree game (mcst-game) is a well-known model within operations research games that
has been widely studied in the literature. In this paper we introduce the multi-criteria version of the mcst-game as a set-
valued TU-game. We prove that the extension of Birds cost allocation rule provides dominance core elements in this
game. We also give a family of core solutions that are diﬀerent from the previous one; these solutions are based on
proportional allocations obtained using scalar solutions of the multi-criteria spanning tree problem. Besides, we prove
necessary and suﬃcient conditions ensuring that the preference core of this game is not empty.
 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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C1. Introduction
Optimization problems in which one or several decision-makers that consider one or several objective
functions, analyze how to act in an optimal way constitute the essence of operations research models.
Optimization theory analyzes situations in which one decision-maker faces an optimization problem with
one or several criteria. If several decision-makers interact conventional game theory is a suitable frame-
work. (See Owen, 1995 for further details.) Finally, when several decision-makers each one controlling
several criteria interact it appears multi-criteria game theory. A methodological approach to cooperative
games with vector-valued payoﬀ can be seen in Fernandez et al. (2002).
Traditionally, operations research focus on choosing the optimal alternatives and game theory focus on
models of competition and cooperation. Nevertheless, recent developments in both disciplines have shown
strong interplay between then. These models are called Operations Research Games (see Borm et al., 2001).
In these models apart from the inherent optimization problem it arises the natural question of how to
allocate the joint cost/beneﬁt among the individual decision-makers. Recently, a new issue in game theory
has been to consider the multi-criteria operations research games, see for instance Nishizaki and Sakawa
(2001) and Fernandez et al. (2001).U* Corresponding author. Tel.: +34-95-455-7940; fax: +34-95-462-2800.
E-mail addresses: fernande@us.es (F.R. Fernandez), mahinram@dee.upo.es (M.A. Hinojosa), puerto@us.es (J. Puerto).
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OF
In this paper we concentrate on the minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) game. These games arise from
analyzing the problem of allocating the costs of a spanning tree in a graph among the users which are
located at the nodes of a graph, with one node reserved for a common supplier which is not to participate in
the cost sharing. This problem was ﬁrst introduced by Claus and Kleitman (1973). Bird, in 1976, suggested
a game theoretic approach to the problem and proposed a cost allocation scheme that consists of assigning
to each player (node) the cost of the edge incident upon the node on the unique path from the source to the
mentioned node in a minimum cost spanning tree. Since there can be more than one minimum cost
spanning tree for a graph, this way of dividing the costs need not lead to a unique cost allocation. Later on,
Granot and Huberman (1981) showed that the allocations arising from Birds cost allocation scheme are
always in the core of the mcst-game (see Curiel, 1997).
Situations in which the cost associated to an edge is a vector instead of a single number yields to multi-
criteria minimum cost spanning tree games that we analyze in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to deﬁne the Pareto-minimum cost spanning tree
game as a set-valued transferable utility (TU) game. We include the necessary concepts about Graph
Theory. In Section 3 we analyze two core concepts for set-valued TU-games. We prove that the extension of
Birds cost allocation rule provides dominance core elements in this game. We also give a family of core
solutions that are diﬀerent from the previous one. PNC
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2. The game
In general, a set-valued TU-game is a pair (N ; V ), where N ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; ng is the set of players and V is a
function which assigns to each coalition S  N a compact subset V ðSÞ of Rk, the characteristic set of co-
alition S, such that V ð;Þ ¼ 0.
Vectors in V ðSÞ represent the worth that the members of coalition S can guarantee by themselves. Notice
that the characteristic function in these games are set-to-set maps instead of the usual set-to-point maps.
Consider a set of N users of some good that is supplied by a common supplier 0 ðN0 ¼ N [ f0gÞ. There is
a multi-criteria cost associated to the distribution system that has to be divided among the users. This
situation can be formulated as a set-valued game with N players and a characteristic function that asso-
ciates to each coalition S a set V ðSÞ that represent the Pareto-minimum cost of constructing a distribution
system among the users in S from the source 0.
Let G ¼ ðN0;EÞ be the complete graph with set of nodes N0 and set of edges (links) denoted by E. There is
a vector of costs associated with the use of each link. Let eij ¼ eji ¼ ðeij1 ; eij2 ; . . . ; eijk Þ denote the vector-valued
cost of using the link fi; jg 2 E. A tree is a connected graph which contains no cycles. A spanning tree for a
given connected graph is a tree, with set of nodes equal to the set of nodes of the given graph, and set of
edges a subset of the set of edges of the given graph connected and without cycles. A Pareto-minimum cost
spanning tree for a given connected graph, with costs on the edges, is a spanning tree which has Pareto-
minimum costs among all spanning trees (see Ehrgott, 2000).
Deﬁnition 2.1. A Pareto-minimum cost spanning tree game, associated to the complete graph G ¼ ðN0;EÞ,
is a pair ðN ; V Þ where N is the set of player and V is the characteristic function deﬁned by:
1. V ð;Þ ¼ f0g,
2. For each non-empty coalition S  N ,
V ðSÞ ¼ v
min
TS0 : spanning tree
X
fi;jg2ETS0
eij;U
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1 where ETS0 is the set of edges of the spanning tree, TS0 , that contains S0 ¼ S [ f0g; and v
min stands for
2 Pareto-minimization.
Remark that the resulting spanning tree TS0 must contain S0 but it may also contain some additional
nodes.
Example 2.1. Consider the complete graph below.
The bi-criteria Pareto-minimum cost spanning tree game associated to the graph is:
Note that V ðf3gÞ is (1,5)t because the Pareto-minimum spanning tree that contains the nodes 0 and 3 is the
subgraph induced by the edges {0,2} and {2,3}.
There are two Pareto-minimum cost spanning trees in the complete graph G for the grand coalition N .
The ﬁrst one correspond to ð2; 6Þt 2 V ðNÞ and the second one correspond to ð4; 5Þt 2 V ðNÞ:
The interesting question that arises when a multi-criteria mcst-game, or in general a set-valued TU-game,
is played is how to allocate fairly an achievable vector zN 2 V ðNÞ among the players.
S {1} {2} {3}{2,3} {1,2} {1,3} N
V ðSÞ 1
3
  
1
2
  
1
5
  
2
3
  
3
5
 
;
2
6
  
2
6
 
;
4
5
  
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ARTICLE IN PRESSFor set-valued TU-games an allocation consists of a matrix X 2 Rkn whose rows are allocations of the
criteria. The ith column, X i ¼ ðxi1; xi2; . . . ; xikÞt represents the payoﬀs of ith player for each criteria and the jth
row, Xj ¼ ðx1j ; x2j ; . . . ; xnj Þ is an allocation among the players of the total amount obtained with respect to
criterion j. The sum XS ¼Pi2S X i is the overall payoﬀ obtained by coalition S.
The matrix X is an allocation of the game (N ; V ) if XN ¼Pi2N X i 2 V ðNÞ. The set of all the allocations
of the game is denoted by IðN ; V Þ.NC
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Apart from eﬃciency and using the individual and collective rationality principles, in what follows we
are going to establish core concepts for multi-criteria mcst-games.
3.1. Preference core
It is reasonable to think that coalitions only accept allocations if they pay less than any of the worths
given by the characteristic set. To simplify the presentation, by XS 6 V ðSÞ we will be denoted that XSj 6 zSj ,
8j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k, 8zS 2 V ðSÞ.
This assumption leads us to introduce the concept of preference core.
Deﬁnition 3.1. The preference core of a game ðN ; V Þ is the set of allocations, X 2 IðN ; V Þ, such that
XS 6 V ðSÞ 8S  N . We will denote this set as CðN ; v; 6 Þ.
In order to characterize the non-emptiness of the preference core, consider a vector z 2 Rk, not neces-
sarily in V ðNÞ, and the following k scalar games:
Deﬁnition 3.2. The scalar l-component minimum cost spanning tree game ðl ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; kÞ associated to z is
a pair ðN ; vzlÞ where N is the set of player and vzl is the characteristic function deﬁned by:
1. vzlð;Þ ¼ 0.
2. For each non-empty coalition S  N ,
vzlðSÞ ¼ minTS0 : spanning tree
X
fi;jg2ETS0
eijl ;
0 where ETS0 is the set of edges of the spanning tree, TS0 , that contains the set of nodes S0 ¼ S [ f0g.
3. vzlðNÞ ¼ zl.For each non-empty coalition, S  N , vzlðSÞ is the solution of the problem:
min zSl ;
s:t: : zS 2 V ðSÞ ;
where zSl , l ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k, is the lth component of vector zS.
Notice that for a ﬁxed coalition S, if an allocation X of the mcst-game, (N ; V Þ, veriﬁes XS 6 V ðSÞ then
XS 6 zðSÞ, where zðSÞ ¼ ðvz1ðSÞ; vz2ðSÞ; . . . ; vzkðSÞÞ denote the k-dimensional vector whose components are,
respectively, the solutions of the above problems. Conversely, if XS 6 zðSÞ then XS 6 V ðSÞ.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the non-emptiness of the preference core is given in the next
result. This condition is based on the balancedness concept of standard scalar cooperative games. For a
deﬁnition of balanced games the reader is referred to Owen (1995).U
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Theorem 3.1. The preference core is non-empty if and only if there exists at least one zN 2 V ðNÞ such that all
the scalar l-component games ðN ; vzNl Þ are balanced.
Proof. If every scalar l-component game ðN ; vzNl Þ is balanced, consider any allocation, Xl, in the core of
ðN ; vzNl Þ, l ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k. Then, the k  n-matrix X whose rows are Xl, l ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k, is an allocation asso-
ciated with zN . Moreover, for each S  N , XS 6 zðSÞ and XS 6 V ðSÞ.
Conversely, let X be an allocation in the preference core such that XN ¼ zN 2 V ðNÞ. Then XS 6 V ðSÞ,
8S  N and XSl 6 vz
N
l ðSÞ, 8S  N , 8l ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k. Therefore, Xl is an allocation in the core of the game
ðN ; vzNl Þ. 
In scalar mcst-game there exists a simple rule to allocate costs among the users in the game. This al-
location, called Bird rule (Bird, 1976), is given by:
‘‘Each player supports the cost of the edge incident upon it on the unique path between 0 and the players
node, in the corresponding minimum spanning tree.’’
This rule can be extended to the multi-criteria msct-game by allocating to each player the cost vector of
the edge incident upon it on the unique path between 0 and the players node, in the corresponding Pareto-
minimum spanning tree.
Example 2.1 (Continued). In the example above, we can allocate (2,6)t 2 V ðNÞ by the matrix 1 1 0
1 2 3
 
that is in the preference core. This allocation has been obtained applying Birds rule to the Pareto-minimum
tree given in the following ﬁgure.
Nevertheless we can not divide among the players the vector zN ¼ ð4; 5Þt 2 V ðNÞ by an allocation in the
preference core because the game ðN ; vzN1 Þ given by:
is not balanced.
Unfortunately extended Birds cost allocation scheme is not, in general, a way to obtain allocations in
the preference core as we show in the following example.
S {1} {2} {3}{2,3} {1,2} {1,3} N
vz
N
1 ðSÞ 1 1 1 2 2 4U
145
147
149
150
151
153
154
155
1578
159
6 F.R. Fernandez et al. / European Journal of Operational Research xxx (2003) xxx–xxx
EOR 5832 No. of Pages 10, DTD = 4.3.1
3 September 2003 Disk used
ARTICLE IN PRESSUN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
Example 3.1. Consider the complete graph below.
The bi-criteria minimum cost spanning tree game associated with the graph is:
Consider zN ¼ ð1; 8Þt 2 V ðNÞ. Applying Deﬁnition 3.2 we obtain that the scalar component games ðN ; vzNl Þ,
l ¼ 1; 2 are given by:
Notice that both games are balanced (Owen, 1995). Therefore the vector (1,8)t can be divided among the
three players by allocations in the preference core. For instance, X ¼ 1 0 0
2 3 3
 
2 CðN ; V ; 6 Þ. However
Birds tree allocation, X ¼ 1 0 0
3 3 2
 
associated with the following Pareto-minimum spanning tree
is not in the preference core because the coalition {1,2} obtains X f1;2g ¼ ð1; 6Þt and X f1;2g6 V ðf1; 2gÞ does
not hold.
S {1} {2} {3}{1,3} {1,2} {2,3} N
V ðSÞ 1
3
  
1
4
  
1
5
  
2
7
 
;
3
5
 
;
1
8
  
1
7
  
3
7
 
;
1
8
  
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vz
N
1 ðSÞ 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
vz
N
2 ðSÞ 3 4 5 5 5 7 8
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3.2. Dominance core
To impose that coalitions only accept allocations in which they pay less than any of the worths given by
the characteristic set is too strong. Now suppose that each coalition S will not accept to pay a total cost
greater than any of the guaranteed costs in V ðSÞ. This will be denoted in the following by XSjV ðSÞ and
means XSjzS 8zS 2 V ðSÞ, that is, there does not exist zS 2 V ðSÞ such that XSj P zSj 8j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k,
XS 6¼ zS .
Deﬁnition 3.3. The dominance core of (N ; V ) is the set of allocations, X 2 IðN ; V Þ, such that
XSjV ðSÞ 8 S  N . We will denote this set as CðN ; V ;jÞ.
Birds cost allocation scheme leads always to an element in the scalar core. In the following result we
prove that any vectorial Birds cost allocation belongs to the dominance core.
Theorem 3.2. Let TN be a Pareto-minimum cost spanning tree of a complete graph with associated cost vector
zN 2 V ðNÞ. Then the corresponding vectorial Bird’s cost allocation is in the dominance core.
Proof. Let X be the vectorial Birds allocation of the Pareto-minimum cost spanning tree TN . It is clear that
XN ¼ zN 2 V ðNÞ and therefore X 2 IðN ; V Þ. For a non-empty coalition S  N let TS be a Pareto-minimum
cost spanning tree on the graph G that contains S [ f0g. Construct a spanning tree bTN for N0 as follows.
Add all the nodes in N n S to TS and for each i 2 N n S add the edge incident upon i on the unique path from
0 to i in TN . Then bTN , constructed in this way is a spanning tree for N0. So, if zSðTSÞ 2 V ðSÞ is the vector of
costs associated to TS, zðbTNÞ ¼ zSðTSÞ þ XNnS is the vector of costs associated to the spanning tree bTN . Then
zNjzðbTN Þ, indeed, zN ¼ XN ¼ XS þ XNnSjzSðTSÞ þ XNnS . Then XSjzSðTSÞ. As TS is any minimum cost
spanning tree on G for S0, we can conclude that XSjV ðSÞ. 
Example 2.1 (Continued). In this example, we show that vector ð4; 5Þt 2 V ðNÞ can not be allocated among
the players by an allocation in the preference core. Nevertheless, as we have seen above, it can be allocated
by Birds cost allocation that is an element of the dominance core:
1 1 2
1 2 2
 
2 CðN ; V ;jÞ.
Apart from Birds cost allocations, there are many other allocations in the dominance core. The question
that arises is whether we can provide a method to obtain, easily, some of them and whether all the vectors
of costs in V ðNÞ can be allocated with this method.
A way to deal with this problems is using topological orders in Rk. As was shown in Ehrgott (2000),
every Pareto optimal spanning tree of a graph is the conventional mcst using the appropriate topological
order. Unfortunately, any topological order may not result in a Pareto optimal tree. Nevertheless, re-
stricting to topological orders induced by an increasing linear utility function, the mcst obtained from the
weighted graph is a Pareto optimal tree.
In what follows we are going to consider only topological orders deﬁned by an strictly increasing linear
utility function u : Rk ! R. In this situation a player or coalition prefers a vector of cost a to another vector
b if uðaÞ6 uðbÞ.
In order to ﬁnd a condition that permits to divide among the players a total cost zN 2 V ðNÞ accordingly
with a given strictly increasing linear utility function, u, we will deﬁne the following scalar game ðN ; vuÞ:Nvuð;Þ ¼ 0; vuðSÞ ¼ min
zS2V ðSÞ
uðzSÞ; 8S  N ; S 6¼ ;: ð1ÞUUsing Birds rule in the scalar game ðN ; vuÞ, we can construct dominance core allocations for somezN 2 V ðNÞ.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSLet x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ be the Birds allocation of the game ðN ; vuÞ. This vector allows us to give a pro-
portional allocation of zN 2 V ðNÞ deﬁned byX ¼ ðX 1; . . . ;XnÞ; where X i ¼ x
i
uðzN Þ z
N 8i 2 N : ð2ÞOO
FThe following theorem states a condition ensuring that these allocations belong to the dominance core.Theorem 3.3. If vuðNÞ ¼ uðzN Þ, zN 2 V ðNÞ then the proportional allocation X deﬁned in (2) belongs to thedominance core of (N ; V ).
Proof. As u is a linear function, ðN ; vuÞ is the mcst-game associated to the graph G with scalar cost on his
edges, uðeijÞ. Let x be the allocation of uðzNÞ obtained by Birds rule applied in ðN ; vuÞ. Then x is a core
allocation for the scalar game. Let X 2 Rkn be the proportional allocation deﬁned in (2). It is straight-
forward that XN ¼Pni¼1 xiuðzN Þ zN ¼ zN and then X 2 IðN ; V Þ. Moreover, if we assume that X 62 CðN ; V ;jÞ
then, there exists a coalition S  N and a vector wS 2 V ðSÞ such that XS PwS , XS 6¼ wS . Then, as u is linear
strictly increasing utility function and as x belongs to the core of the game ðN ; vuÞ,PRminzS2V ðSÞ uðzSÞ6 uðwSÞ < uðXSÞ ¼Xi2S uðX iÞ ¼Pi2S xiuðzN Þ uðzN Þ ¼ xS 6 vuðSÞ ¼ minzS2V ðSÞ uðzSÞ:UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
DThis is a contradiction. Example 2.1 (Continued). Suppose that the strictly increasing linear utility function, u, used to compare theworth of the coalitions consist of giving triple importance to the second criterion, that is, the utility of
vector a is uðaÞ ¼ a1 þ 3a2. Then, the scalar game ðN ; vuÞ is:
In this case, vuðNÞ ¼ uðð4; 5ÞtÞ, the mcst for the weighted graph is the Pareto-optimal tree associated to
zN ¼ ð4; 5Þt and ðN ; vuÞ is the mcst-game associated to the weighted graph.
Therefore Birds cost allocation x ¼ ð4; 7; 8Þ is in the core of ðN ; vuÞ. Then the proportional allocation
X ¼
16
19
28
19
32
19
20
19
35
19
40
19
 
2 CðN ; V ;jÞ.
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
vuðSÞ 10 7 6 11 18 16 19
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Notice that the allocations obtained with this method are diﬀerent from those obtained applying the
vectorial Birds rule to the corresponding Pareto> mcst-game.
Unfortunately is not always possible to ﬁnd a topological order, deﬁned through an increasing linear
utility function, for every zN 2 V ðNÞ.
Example 3.2. Consider the complete graph where all the links fi; jg not drawn below have costs ð5; 5Þt:
Three Pareto-minimum cost spanning trees for this graph areCTT1 ¼ ff0; 1g; f0; 2g; f0; 3g; f0; 4g; with associated cost ð3; 5Þ
t
;
T2 ¼ ff0; 1g; f2; 4g; f0; 3g; f5:5; 3gg; with associated cost ð5:5; 3Þt;
T3 ¼ ff0; 1g; f2; 4g; f0; 3g; f3; 4gg; with associated cost ð4:5; 4Þt:EThen zN ¼ ð4:5; 4Þt is a solution of minzN2V ðNÞ uðzN Þ for no increasing linear utility function u.NC
OR
R
4. Final remarks
This paper contains the methodological developments of the multi-criteria mcst-games through the
analysis of their dominance and preference cores. However, there is enough room for further research. An
interesting avenue of research should aim to construct new core concepts being consistent with the pref-
erence structure of the decision-maker. In particular, this scheme would lead to construct interactive
procedures, which could be used by the decision-maker in decision support systems when the original core
sets do not reduce to a singleton.
Another issue that deserves future research is the application of this model to real problems. There are
challenging economical models in the new Europe that clearly fall into this category: design and operation
of a common oil pipeline network, operation of existing inter-Europe electrical distribution network, . . .
These topics are currently under research and will be considered in a follow up paper.U
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